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Abstract
This paper explores a new channel for the transmission of mone-
tary policy through the extensive margin. In this paper, a shock to
money induces ﬁrms to enter by aﬀecting a measure of Tobin’s Q: the
ratio of expected future proﬁts to entry costs. In a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium setting, though, optimal consumption smoothing
limits the ﬂow of entering ﬁrms. As a result, the model generates pos-
itively correlated, persistent and hump-shaped responses of output,
consumption and ﬁrm entry to monetary shocks, as observed in the
data. This is obtained via an endogenous source of inertia and despite
minimal nominal rigidities, as only one-time entry costs – as opposed
to goods prices or wages – are assumed to be sticky.
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21 Introduction
Considerations of richer and more realistic ﬁrm dynamics are permeating
ﬁelds as diverse as trade, real business cycles, open macro and recently mon-
etary policy. Much of this impulse ﬁnds root in a burgeoning empirical liter-
ature having turned the spot-light on ﬁrm entry as a key driver of observed
macro-economic patterns. In response to these ﬁndings, theoretical models
have emerged to link the entry decision of ﬁrms to product variety, aggre-
gate productivity, export behavior, terms of trade, and markups, uncovering
new propagation mechanisms and shedding light on thus far puzzling styl-
ized facts. This paper follows the impetus provided by this growing body of
literature and attempts to extend the reﬂection on ﬁrm dynamics to the ﬁeld
of monetary policy.
In particular, this paper’s innovation is to incorporate endogenous en-
try into a monetary model and thereby emphasize a novel channel for the
transmission of monetary policy. The appeal of this channel is it’s ability
to reproduce stylized facts despite minimal exogenous sources of persistence.
A temporary monetary shock, in this paper, generates persistent as well as
hump-shaped responses of output, consumption, investment and new ﬁrm
entry, as observed in the data. It also reproduces documented stylized facts
showing the positive correlation of ﬁrm entry with monetary innovations.
These results rest on an endogenous source of persistence and are found de-
spite ﬂexible goods prices. The only source of rigidity are stick sunk entry
costs.
We construct a model based on monopolistic competition, in which ﬁrms
have to pay a sunk cost to enter. These are meant to capture costs from the
3set-up of operations, ﬁnancing, hiring, R&D, marketing or other activities.
For ease and clarity of exposition, we capture these sunk costs in a stylized
fashion, by subsuming them into what we call legal fees, charged by lawyers.
This is purely an artiﬁcial construct, or “trick”, to simplify the analysis.
We also refer to ﬁrm entry throughout the paper, but the process is general
enough to encompass the introduction of new products or the expansion of
an existing ﬁrm or product into a new market.
We introduce nominal rigidities only in entry costs, or legal fees. We do
so by assuming that lawyers set their fees according to a Calvo (1983) model.
This allows monetary policy to be eﬀective, despite goods prices remaining
ﬂexible throughout the analysis. A monetary shock aﬀects a measure of
Tobin’s Q, namely the ratio of a ﬁrm’s expected future proﬁts to cost of
entry, and propagates through the real economy by aﬀecting investment in
new ﬁrms, and thus consumption, output and other key variables. As a
result, monetary policy is pro-cyclical with ﬁrm entry, as has been noted in
the empirical papers reviewed below. This channel takes eﬀect in addition
to the more traditional interest rate channel of New Keynesian models.
The sluggish, hump-shaped responses central to our results rest on an
endogenous source of persistence stemming from a tradeoﬀ between con-
sumption and investment, ampliﬁed by a time to build lag in production.
We show that if lawyer fees are merely a transfer from ﬁrms to consumers,
investment in new ﬁrms is not constrained by the impetus to smooth con-
sumption. But if investment in new ﬁrms comes at the cost of consumption,
a monetary shock will spread sluggishly through the economy.
A ﬁnal interest of working with endogenous entry is to study the welfare
4impact of monetary policy stemming from variations in product variety. We
do so by showing that the expansionary eﬀects of a monetary shock (mea-
sured in welfare-relevant terms) depend on consumers’ love of variety. This
approach is inspired by the seminal work on estimating the gains from variety
expansion by Broda and Weinstein (2004, 2006).
Evidence linking monetary policy to ﬁrm entry is starting to trickle
through the literature. Ghironi and Melitz (2005), as well as Bilbiie et al.
(2005) document in detail the notable pro-cyclicality of ﬁrm entry. The
diﬃculty is to extract from these results the correlation between monetary
policy and ﬁrm entry: it could be positive when growth in GDP emanates
from an expansionary monetary policy surprise, but negative when central
banks tighten policy to cool a period of strong output growth. Bergin and
Corsetti (2005) help untangle the two eﬀects using a VAR methodology. They
conclude that monetary expansions are positively correlated to ﬁrm entry.
These ﬁndings are corroborated in Lewis (2006) who, in a similar VAR ex-
ercise, identiﬁes both monetary and real shocks and captures the positive
and hump-shaped response of ﬁrm entry to a monetary surprise. Davis et
al. (1998), in their inﬂuential book Job Creation and Destruction, ﬁnd sim-
ilar results, but at a relatively lower frequency, tied to trends in monetary
policy. These ﬁndings substantiate common intuition that monetary policy
aﬀects ﬁrm behavior directly, not only through consumer demand, especially
if entry is taken generally to encompass capacity expansion, new product
introductions, project developments in addition to new ﬁrm incorporations.
There also exists mounting, if not comfortably established, evidence for
the persistent as well as hump-shaped responses of consumption, output and
5investment that our model generate. Most recently, Christiano et al. (2005)
revisit some of their seminal 1999 results using a limited information VAR
procedure to highlight that an expansionary monetary policy shock induces
“a hump-shaped response of output, consumption and investment, a hump-
shaped response in inﬂation, a fall in the interest rate, a rise in proﬁts, real
wages and labor productivity, and an immediate rise in the growth rate of
money” (Christiano et al., 2005, p. 6). In an inﬂuential study, Romer and
Romer (2004) corroborate these results after pinpointing monetary policy
surprises thanks to the meticulous exercise of accounting for the intentions,
information and forecasts discussed in FOMC meetings. Their implied re-
sponse of output to a monetary shock follows a hump-shaped pattern, with,
interestingly, an initial much smaller hump in the opposite direction. The
impulse response functions emanating from our model exhibit these same
features, sharing, in some cases, Romer and Romer’s ‘dual hump’ pattern.
The predictions in this paper also resonate with a well established liter-
ature outside the ﬁeld of monetary policy – that of sunk costs and market
structure in the ﬁeld of IO. As mentioned earlier, the transmission channel
for monetary policy at the heart of this paper goes from a monetary shock
to sunk costs to ﬁrm entry. The latter part of this causal link is a central
theme in the IO literature, captured with great clarity and detail in Sutton’s
(1991) inﬂuential book Sunk Costs and Market Structure. The book builds
a theory by which concentration, or the number of ﬁrms in a given industry,
is a positive function of market size and a negative function of set-up, or
sunk, costs. This relationship is so general, argues Sutton, that it ﬁts both
industries where goods are homogeneous and horizontally diﬀerentiated (as
6in Shaked and Sutton, 1987) and is supported by a very comprehensive set
of case studies.
This paper contributes to several literatures, in part by virtue of strad-
dling the traditional New Keynesian literature and that on ﬁrm entry dynam-
ics. With respect to the former, we build the monetary side of the model
using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, as prescribed by
much of the literature’s representative works, such as Goodfriend and King
(1998), Clarida et al. (1999), Gali (2002), or Woodford (2003). We add
money in the utility function and budget constraint, yet we introduce a much
less severe form of price stickiness than inherent in these models, by allowing
goods prices to remain ﬂexible throughout the analysis. We only restrict the
one-time sunk entry costs from adapting immediately to monetary surprises
by imposing a time-contingent Calvo (1983) pricing behavior on lawyers.
Despite this minimal source of rigidity, monetary policy has signiﬁcant real
consequences.
One of the drawbacks of standard New Keynesian models is their inability
to generate suﬃcient sluggishness (slow to move away from steady state) and
persistence (slow to move back to steady state) in the responses of inﬂation
and real variables to a monetary shock. Gali and Gertler (1999), as well
as Gali (2002), discuss this limitation and oﬀer an inroad to a solution, by
assuming that a certain percentage of ﬁrms are backward, and not forward,
looking. Although this assumption alters the results as desired, this line of
reasoning has been criticized as somewhat ad-hoc.
More recent models have noticeably improved predictive capacity while
oﬀering sounder micro-foundations, but at the cost of a series of exogenous as-
7sumptions introducing rigidities; a direction we try to avoid. One of the most
successful papers in capturing hump-shaped responses to monetary shocks
is Christiano et al. (2005).1 This model essentially dampens the reaction
of marginal costs to monetary shocks, by introducing wage stickiness and
variable capital utilization, as well as habit formation in preferences and
adjustment costs in investment. We hope to provide an alternative model-
ing approach, resting on fewer sources of exogenous inertia and emphasizing
closer ties with microfoundations.
With respect to the literature on ﬁrm entry dynamics, this paper’s in-
novation is to extend the techniques and reﬂections to the ﬁeld of monetary
policy. The backbone of our model is inspired in great part from the in-
ﬂuential work of Bilbiie et al. (2005) in the real business cycle literature.
Indeed, we borrow this model’s ﬁrm dynamics based on sunk entry costs and
a one period lag separating entry from production, thus making the number
of ﬁrms a state variable. In fact, it is these two elements that diﬀerentiate
the real part of our model from the earlier work of Chatterjee and Cooper
(1993) who also consider endogenous entry but with ﬁxed period-by-period
costs and instantaneous entry. Like in Bilbiie et al. (2005), we also allow con-
sumers to invest in new ﬁrms as an additional channel to bring wealth from
one period to the next. Despite these similarities (which we try to emphasize
for ease of reading by adopting similar notation wherever possible), we diﬀer
not only in adding a monetary side to the model, but also in our speciﬁcation
of entry costs as being only in consumption units, and not absorbing labor
from production.
1Other seminal, but older papers, are Fuhrer and Moore (1995) or Blanchard and Katz
(1999), which oﬀer stories based on inertial wage setting behavior.
8Some other papers have recently tackled the impact of monetary policy
on the extensive margin, each with a diﬀerent perspective and each – like ours
– tentatively suggesting an inroad into this new literature. While our paper
concentrates on the propagation mechanism of monetary policy and obtaining
realistic impulse response functions, Bergin and Corsetti (2005) focus instead
on the welfare implications of monetary policy. Indeed, Bergin and Corsetti
(2005) simplify ﬁrm dynamics to concentrate instead on a rich discussion and
comparison of optimal policy rules, as well as build an argument for the role
of central banks to regulate product variety. Firms, in their paper, only live
two periods and goods prices are set one period in advance. This yields a
positive correlation between a monetary expansion and ﬁrm entry, as well as
some persistence in entry, but no persistence in output, nor, by extension,
consumption. More recently, Lewis (2006) and Bilbiie et al. (2007) oﬀer
similar perspectives on the issue. Lewis (2006) closely reproduces the RBC
model in Bilbiie et al. (2005), but adds monopoly power in wage setting,
thereby making monetary policy eﬀective. The model is especially oriented
to inform a convincing empirical part in which a VAR methodology is used
to estimate impulse responses to both real and monetary shocks. Finally,
Bilbiie et al. (2007) construct a model with sticky goods prices yielding
a somewhat roundabout but innovative transmission channel of monetary
policy going from interest rates to bond prices, to equity prices, to marginal
costs, to inﬂation. The model allows for a rich discussion of optimal policy
and comparisons to traditional New Keynesian models. It also produces
desirable predictions of pro-cyclical proﬁts and output, yet produces anti-
cyclical entry. The latter comes from the distortionary eﬀects of inﬂation on
9entry, as ﬁrm proﬁts are aﬀected by quadratic price adjustment costs.2
Finally, it is important to distinguish this paper from the New Keyne-
sian monetary literature with endogenous, or ﬁrm speciﬁc, capital and time
to build lags. It is true, as Bilbiie et al. (2005) point out, that there is a
parallel between the number of ﬁrms and capital stock, as well as between
ﬁrm entry and investment. Yet, especially in monetary models, the paral-
lel is limited. In models such as Woodford (2005), Mash (2002), Casares
(2002), or even Christiano et al. (2005), a long time to build lag as well as
sticky prices, sticky wages and adjustment costs are necessary to yield plau-
sible results, contrarily to our reliance on endogenous sources of persistence.
In particular, the substantial time to build lag is an integral and external
source of sluggishness in these models, while in our model the one period
lag exists primarily for technical reasons: to generate a diﬀerence equation.
Sluggishness is instead rooted in consumption smoothing.
This paper is organized as follows. Section (2) lays out the benchmark
model under ﬂexible entry costs and section (3) overviews the correspond-
ing impulse response functions emanating from a shock to entry costs. Go-
ing through this initial exercise achieves three goals. First, it presents the
model’s core elements, which are common to the sticky entry cost formu-
2Other papers of particular interest, but more distantly related, are worth mentioning.
Stebunovs (2006) considers the impact on bank deregulation on entry, emphasizing the
role of sunk entry costs. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) is the primary paper reviving interest
in ﬁrm dynamics in an open macro framework, suggesting an endogenous explanation for
the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect and a new hypothesis for the terms of trade eﬀect
of a productivity shock. Corsetti et al. (2005) draw an important distinction between
productivity gains that lower marginal costs versus entry costs and study the eﬀect of
each on terms of trade and welfare. Finally, Chen et al. (2006) show how greater openness
increases average productivity and decreases markups, thus keeping inﬂation in check.
Each paper incorporates diﬀerent aspects of ﬁrm dynamics to reach novel conclusions and
insist on the interplay between microfoundations and macro phenomena.
10lation. Second, it introduces the endogenous source of inertia in a simple
environment. Third, it builds intuition for the transmission of monetary pol-
icy, since a monetary shock aﬀects the economy in similar ways as a shock to
entry costs. Section (4) formally introduces nominal rigidities in entry costs
and shows how monetary policy can be eﬀective. Section (5) follows with a
discussion of simulation results under sticky entry costs. Finally, section (6)
concludes.
2 The benchmark model with ﬂexible prices
and entry costs
2.1 Firms’ basics
Firms are assumed to be homogeneous. Given symmetry, we avoid using
the i subscript to denote ﬁrm speciﬁc variables and instead use lower case
letters unless otherwise noted (by contrast, capital letters capture aggregate
variables). Firms employ only labor, lt, and produce with a common level of
productivity, Zt. Output per ﬁrm can be summarized as:
yt = Ztlt (1)










where Wt is the nominal wage, and the superscript n indicates nominal vari-
ables, wherever a distinction is called for. As is usual in a CES environment
(speciﬁed later), the resulting optimal price corresponds to a ﬁxed markup









11where θ > 1 is the degree of substitution between varieties in the CES con-
sumption index (deﬁned later).
2.2 Firm dynamics
Firms are not only free to set their price, but also to enter the economy,
a decision they make if their expected proﬁts pay back a sunk entry cost,
fE,t. Contrarily to Bilbiie et al. (2005), we deﬁne entry costs not in terms of
eﬀective labor units, but of consumption units, again with the goal of intro-
ducing the minimal set of assumptions necessary to obtain realistic impulse
response functions. We will see later how this cost is pivotal to introduce
nominal rigidities, as it can be seen as sticky or determined in advance.
There are many possible interpretations for such an entry barrier. These
include costs such as setup, recruitment, market research, ﬁnancing, product
adaption, advertising, R&D, or legal. For simplicity and clarity of exposition,
we subsume all possible costs into the latter and assume that ﬁrms must pay
a lawyer an amount fE,t before entering. Technically, this is equivalent to
assuming a horizontal supply curve for legal services at the level fE,t. Again,
as highlighted in the introduction, this is purely an artiﬁcial construct to
simplify the analysis; when speaking of lawyers, we should in fact continue
to keep in mind the above mentioned sources of entry costs.
Firms weigh these entrance fees against the expected net present value of
proﬁts from engaging in business. In doing so, ﬁrms also take into account an
exogenously deﬁned probability δ of being hit by a so-called “death shock”,














where β is a subjective time discount factor and the consumption ratio ap-
pears as a stochastic discount factor to take into account variations in output
from one period to another.
We know that at equilibrium, when all ﬁrms have entered, the expected
net present value of proﬁts must equal the entry cost. Indeed, when these
two measures are equalized, there is no more incentive for additional ﬁrms
to enter. Thus, we call this point the free entry condition, deﬁned as:
vt = fE,t (5)
The last piece to the puzzle is the time to build lag which we assume
characterizes entering ﬁrms, as in Bilbiie et al. (2005). Mathematically, this
is an important assumption to give Nt, the state variable, a proper equation of
motion. From an intuitive standpoint, the assumption is just as defendable,
as new ﬁrms may have to build clientele, a distribution network, a brand or
simply a new product, after sinking their entry costs, but before being able
to sell anything. The equation of motion for the number of ﬁrms is therefore
Nt = (1 − δ)(Nt−1 + NE,t−1) (6)
where NE,t−1 is the number of ﬁrms that entered in period t−1 and are able
to produce in period t. Thus, Nt is the number of active ﬁrms in any given
period t.
3This is a simpliﬁed, yet important assumption to keep the number of ﬁrms ﬁnite and
ensure that the number of ﬁrms returns to equilibrium after a shock. A more elaborate
form of this assumption could account for state- or time-contingent exit, as in Hopenhayn
(1992a, 1992b). See Melitz (2003) for a more detailed discussion of both entry costs and
exit shocks.
132.3 Introducing the consumption-investment tradeoﬀ
Before considering the equations characteristic of consumer demand, it is
important to discuss a fundamental assumption giving rise to the inertial
responses of the model’s real variables. Consumers are worker-owners. Their
revenues, made up of wages and ﬁrm proﬁts, account for aggregate pro-
duction. From these proceeds, they decide how much to consume and how
much to invest in new ﬁrms by ﬁnancing entry costs. In turn, new ﬁrms
pay these sunk costs to a representative lawyers who, we assume, consumes
the totality of her earnings. So from an aggregate standpoint, equilibrium
is maintained and total consumption (from consumers and lawyers) equals
output. But from the standpoint of consumers, there arises an important
tradeoﬀ between consumption and investment. Although investment is at-
tractive to create ﬁrms which later pay dividends, it comes at the cost of
foregoing present consumption. Thus, the impetus to smooth consumption
bestows noticeable persistence to investment. In appendix A.1 we show how
consumers’ and lawyers’ consumption can be aggregated such that the usual
CES results hold.
In the appendix (A.4 – A.7), we also introduce a second variant of the
baseline model considered here, in which there is no tradeoﬀ between con-
sumption and investment, since lawyers simply rebate their earnings to con-
sumers without absorbing any of the economy’s production. This is a stan-
dard assumption, characteristic, for instance, of models with endogenous
capital. Thus, consumption is not constrained by the creation of new ﬁrms.
It is useful to juxtapose these two variants, as we do when discussing re-
sults, to help emphasize the key role played by the consumption-investment
14tradeoﬀ.
2.4 Consumer behavior
In this section and those following, we consider only the consumption of con-
sumers, while we postpone the analysis of the consumption of lawyers (whose
utility function is isomorphic, except that they have an inﬁnite discount fac-
tor and thus undertake no investment; details are provided in appendix A.1).
We come back to join the two sources of consumption when considering ag-
gregate accounting in section 2.7.
The model is characterized by a representative consumer maximizing her
inﬁnite lifetime utility over consumption, Ct, real money balances, Mt/Pt






















where β is a subjective discount factor.
The budget constraint must be altered slightly with respect to standard
monetary models to account for ﬁrm dynamics, by allowing consumers to
invest in risk free bonds as well as in a risky but potentially more rewarding
mutual fund of ﬁrms. Each period, consumers can choose to buy a share xt
of this fund, at a price equal to the expected net present value of proﬁts of all
existing ﬁrms: vt(Nt+NE,t). Investment in the mutual fund yields dividends
one period later, equal to proﬁts of all operating ﬁrms, Nt+1dt+1, in addition
to the liquidation value of the portfolio, vt+1Nt+1. Thus, the representative
consumer faces the following constraint, written in nominal terms (where,
15again, the superscript n clariﬁes, if necessary, when a variable is nominal):
PtCt + Mt + R
−1
t Bt + v
n
t (Nt + NE,t)xt =




t )Ntxt−1 + Tt (8)
where Rt ≡ (1 + it) and it is the nominal interest rate, Bt are zero coupon
nominal bonds, and Tt are lump sum seignorage transfers, such that Mt =
Mt−1+Tt in equilibrium. Note that by making use of the free entry condition
(5), the amount consumers allocate to ﬁnancing new ﬁrm entry, vn
t NE,txt, is
in fact the sum of all entry fees paid to lawyers, fn
E,tNE,txt. As per the
earlier discussion on the consumption-investment tradeoﬀ, these fees are re-
linquished to lawyers and thus do not show up on the right hand side of the
budget constraint (as they would if they were rebated to consumers, as in
the model’s second variant presented in the appendix).









where At ≡ N
ξ− 1
θ−1
t , as in Benassy (1996).4 This term allows us to dissociate
consumers’ love of variety from the elasticity of substitution between goods.
This is particularly important in our case since we work with variables that
are “welfare relevant” in the way that they take into account the eﬀect of
variety on consumer utility. Thus, the use of At allows us to explicitly test
the robustness of our results to the link between variety and utility. Indeed,
we may either be interested in measuring welfare, or in matching commonly
available data (since most statistical agencies do not account for variety in
4It is becoming increasingly common to ﬁnd such a speciﬁcation in the literature. See,
for instance, Corsetti et al. (2005), Bergin and Corsetti (2005), or the appendix of Bilbiie
et al. (2005).
16reporting prices, or at least do so at a low frequency). Indeed, note that
when ξ = 1/(θ − 1), the above consumption index simpliﬁes to the classic
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) case, but when ξ = 0, there is no more love of variety
and, in particular, aggregate prices equal ﬁrm speciﬁc prices, as is evident
from the deﬁnitions below.
Accordingly, aggregate prices are found by summing ﬁrm speciﬁc prices










so that the relative price, ρt can be expresses as:
ρt ≡ pt/Pt = N
ξ
t = [θ/(θ − 1)]ωt/Zt (11)
since pt is the same for all ﬁrms. The relative price ρt will lead to useful
simpliﬁcations down the line. For now, it is important to emphasize that
when ξ is positive, a rise in the number of ﬁrms will depress the aggregate
price Pt, everything else equal. This is commonly referred to as the variety
eﬀect. More ﬁrms oﬀer a wider range of choices to consumers, thus increasing
value per unit of expenditure. In this way, the aggregate price is “welfare
relevant” (as are all real variables in our model), capturing “subjective value”
as perceived by consumers.
2.5 Optimality conditions
On this backdrop, consumers optimize both between consumption, leisure
and real money held in any given period, as well as between consumption in
subsequent periods. This yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:

































With respect to shares (the Euler equation in shares):5
C
−γ



















where Yt represents total expenditure on goods, equal to both consumers’
and lawyers’ consumption, as shown in section 2.7 below and discussed in
more details in appendix A.1.
2.6 A closer look at the labor market
The aggregate pricing condition (11) and the optimal ﬁrm price equation (3)







which is in itself an interesting equation, underlying the fact that as the
number of ﬁrms increases, real wages must also increase to attract more
5Note, as is standard, that the forward solution to this Euler equation yields the equa-
tion for ﬁrm value in (4).
18workers as needed by the greater number of ﬁrms. The above expression,
along with the labor supply function (13), yields an expression for total













where it is clear that labor supply rises in tandem with real wages, but
decreases with consumption, due to the decreasing marginal utility of con-
sumption.
We also know that in aggregate, by assuming full employment, labor
market accounting suggests that Lt = Ntlt.6 We then specify an aggregate
production function taking the form Yt = Ntρtyt = N
ξ+1
t yt, since all ﬁrms
are homogeneous and where ρt is included to convert output in terms of the
consumption good (in real terms). Coupled with the ﬁrm level production
















where the number of ﬁrms enters to capture the impact of variety on output,
again underscoring the “welfare-relevant” nature of our real variables. This
eﬀect is in fact both direct and indirect, as shown by the inclusion of Nt
in the middle equation as well as in the far right equation, where it enters
through real wages and labor supply.
6Note that this labor market accounting condition is diﬀerent from the more compli-
cated equivalent found in the New Keynesian literature, as in Gali (2002), where, due
to Calvo pricing, not all ﬁrms charge the same price at any given time, thus producing
diﬀerent amounts of output and employing diﬀerent numbers of workers. In that case,
we cannot simplify the integral Lt =
R
Nt ltdi to Lt = Ntlt, as above, but must take into
account price distortions.
19Finally, using the equation for proﬁts (2), the equation for relative prices
(11), the labor supply equation (18) and the aggregate production function





Thus, ﬁrms’ proﬁts naturally increase with aggregate output and decrease
with the degree of substitutability between goods (a measure of competitive
intensity) and the number of ﬁrms (which, as per the variety eﬀect discussed
earlier, increase each ﬁrm’s relative price ρt, thus depressing sales per ﬁrm).
This latter eﬀect, though, is partially oﬀset by the positive relationship be-
tween output, Yt, and the number of ﬁrms.
2.7 Aggregate accounting
When aggregating the budget constraint over all consumers, and imposing
equilibrium conditions such that bonds are in zero net supply (or Bt = Bt−1 =
0), the representative consumer holds the entire equity portfolio (or xt =
xt−1 = 1) and lump sum transfers from seignorage exactly match money
growth (or Mt = Mt−1 + Tt), we obtain:
PtCt + v
n
t NE,t = WtLt + d
n
t Nt = Y
n
t (21)
where the left hand side represents aggregate consumption and net invest-
ment, and the right hand side labor and proﬁt revenue (or returns on invest-
ment) which can be shown to equal aggregate output (see appendix A.1 for
the derivation), thus satisfying general equilibrium.
202.8 Steady state analysis
The complete derivation of steady state results appears in appendix A.2.
Here, we instead report the results central to our story, namely the correlation
between entry costs and consumption as well as the number of ﬁrms. The



























These equations are especially eloquent (after some manipulation, as show
in appendix A.2) on the long term negative eﬀects of a rise in entry costs
on the number of ﬁrms and consumption. Indeed, as shown in appendix
A.2, ∂N
∂fE < 0, conﬁrming general intuition. An increase in fE raises ﬁrm
value as conﬁrmed by the free entry condition (5). Recall that ﬁrm value,
v, is also equal to the expected net present value of proﬁts. Thus, for a
constant discount factor, the only way that v can appreciate is for proﬁts
to increase as well. And as discussed above, proﬁts grow as the number of
ﬁrms diminishes and output per ﬁrm rises. Thus, not only does the steady
state analysis conﬁrm the intimate relationship between the entry cost and
the number of ﬁrms, as intuition would have told us from the beginning, but
it turns the spotlight on the free entry condition as the main constraint on
ﬁrm dynamics. To complete our overview of the steady state, we also note
that ∂C
∂fE > 0 (also shown in the appendix), since fewer ﬁrms will need less
investment to oﬀset dying ﬁrms and thus allow for more consumption.
212.9 Solving for the model’s dynamics
Our goal here is to deﬁne a system of minimal dimensions suﬃcient to solve
for the model’s state variables. The Euler equation in shares (15) constitutes
the ﬁrst diﬀerence equation in Ct and Nt. The second equation comes from
the equation of motion of ﬁrms (6). In both cases, we must ﬁrst solve for the
number of new ﬁrms, NE,t.
To do so, we use the aggregate accounting condition (21), which acts as
a constraint on how much investment can be undertaken given a level of















Appropriately, in steady state, ∂NE/∂fE < 0, as well as ∂NE/∂C < 0,
as shown in appendix A.2. This indicates that as entry costs increase fewer
ﬁrms are created, thereby conﬁrming that there is indeed a tradeoﬀ between
investing in new ﬁrms and consuming. The solution to NE,t can then be
plugged into the equation of motion of ﬁrms which, with the Euler equation
in shares, yields a system of two diﬀerence equations with a stable solution.
Appendix A.3 presents this system in linearized form, as well as the additional
equations needed to ﬁnd the remaining variables of interest, once the paths
for Ct and Nt have been resolved.
223 Simulation results under ﬂexible prices and
exogenous entry costs
3.1 Calibrations
In order for our results to be comparable to those in the relevant literatures,
we employ standard parameter values to calibrate our model. We assume log
utility for consumption and thus set γ = 1, in line with real business cycle
models, such that wealth and substitution eﬀects cancel and the model be
consistent with a balanced growth path. We follow Gali (2002) who draws
from Chari et al. (1997) in setting the semi-elasticity of money demand, ν, to
unity. We also work with a very low wage elasticity of labor supply since we
consider a short run impact, and thus set ϕ = 0.25. We relax this assumption
in the more detailed analysis of sticky entry costs dynamics. As is standard
in the real business cycle literature, we interpret periods as quarters and set
β = 0.99. We then follow Bilbiie et al. (2005), who set the elasticity of
substitution between goods, θ, to 3.8, as in Bernard et al. (2003), instead of
the higher 6 used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) or 11 as in Gali (2002).
We also set the death shock as in Bilbiie et al. (2005) to 0.025 in line with
ﬁndings of approximately 10% labor destruction per year. In addition, we
work with ξ = 1/(θ−1) as in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) case, so that
the love of variety and the elasticity of substitution between goods concur.
We introduce diﬀerent values of ξ in later robustness tests. Finally, for all
simulations in this paper, we consider that productivity remains constant.
233.2 Benchmark model with tradeoﬀ
In these simulations, we concentrate on shocks to entry costs, to build in-
tuition for the more complex mechanisms underlying the transmission of
monetary policy. In ﬁgure 1, we therefore limit our attention to the variables
most instructive for our model’s fundamental dynamics: Ct, Nt, and NE,t.
We consider the shock to entry costs to be temporary. We thus assume
b fE,t+1 = φb fE,t+t, where t is increased by 1% at the time of the shock. This
yields a path of sunk costs shown in ﬁgure 1, returning to steady state after
50 periods. But the duration of the shock is an artifact of our particular
parameter values, notably of our somewhat arbitrary choice of φ = 0.9. It is
rather the shock’s eﬀect on other variables that is central.
The ﬁrst result to stand out is the persistence of the model’s variables
over and above that of entry costs. This can be seen most clearly in the
impulse response of the number of ﬁrms which strays from steady state for
about 70 periods (thus 40% longer than entry costs). In graphs generated
with φ = 0.09, this result is even more striking; entry costs are back at their
steady state level within a few periods, but the number of ﬁrms only returns
to steady state after about 35 periods.7
The tradeoﬀ between consumption and investment – at the origin of the
inertia noted above – is most evident in the path of consumption. Initially,
when entry costs are lowest and investment (NE,t) at its peak, consumption
must decrease below steady state to satisfy the budget constraint. Only
after a few periods does consumption rise again, following the increase in the
number of ﬁrms.
7These results are available upon request.
24Investment – or the creation of new ﬁrms – peaks early, and later over-
shoots its steady state. This illustrates several mechanisms. First, there are
intertemporal eﬀects, in that ﬁrms try to enter as close as possible to the
trough in entry costs. This explains the drop to below steady state invest-
ment after the original peak. But, second, because of the impetus to smooth
consumption, investment is not instantaneous, but stretches over the ﬁrst 25
periods. As a result, the number of ﬁrms and consumption follow a regu-
lar hump-shaped pattern. This result has potentially important empirical
implications, suggesting that the contemporaneous correlation between en-
try costs and the number of new ﬁrms would be not be as high as perhaps
intuitively expected, even if, in fact, the two are intimately related.
Finally, our results substantiate our discussion of the steady state. In-
deed, the number of ﬁrms moves in the opposite direction as entry costs. As
discussed earlier, lower sunk costs depress expected ﬁrm value in equlibrium,
calling for lower proﬁts and thus a greater number of total ﬁrms.
3.3 Benchmark model without tradeoﬀ
As mentioned earlier, we develop a second variant of the benchmark model
(in appendix A.4 – A.7) where the fees received by lawyers are rebated to
consumers, thus nullifying the tradeoﬀ between consumption and investment.
The impulse responses in this second variant are worth brieﬂy dwelling upon,
as they clearly show the central role played by the consumption-investment
tradeoﬀ in generating persistence and sluggishness. Indeed, a look at ﬁgure 2
immediately conﬁrms that any inertia in the number of ﬁrms or consumption
only mimics that of entry costs. In other words, there is no additional inertia
in the system than that exogenously assumed in the driving variable.
25The behavior of investment – or the number of new ﬁrms – is interesting
none-the-less. With respect to the earlier variant, there is a much stronger
inter-temporal shift in the creation of ﬁrms towards the period immediately
following the shock. Indeed, that is when sunk costs are lowest. Although
they remain below steady state for another ﬁfty periods, ﬁrms prefer to
take advantage of the most favorable possible conditions for entry, especially
when investment is not constrained by consumption smoothing objectives.
As shown in the graph, ﬁrm creation even becomes negative after the initial
boom. We therefore notice no smoothing of investment what-so-ever (as a
result of the lack of tradeoﬀ with consumption).
Consumption (equal to output in this variant of the model since lawyers
don’t consume; see appendix A.5 for details) instead follows the number
of producing ﬁrms. This conﬁrms our earlier discussion suggesting that
although ﬁrm-speciﬁc output decreases with more ﬁrms, aggregate output
increases. Finally, the fact that consumption is free to increase while new
ﬁrms are created comes from the lack of tradeoﬀ between consumption and
investment.
4 The model with nominal rigidities
4.1 The channel of transmission
We have seen that ﬁrms decide to enter based on the relationship between
expected proﬁts and cost of entry. Thus, in order to be eﬀective, monetary
policy must be in a position to alter either one, or the ratio of the two, which
is akin to Tobin’s Q. Of course, from a modeling standpoint, this poses an
interesting question. On which side should nominal rigidities be modeled:
26expected proﬁts or costs of entry? Expected proﬁts are discounted by the
real interest rate, as seen in equation (4).8 A possible channel for monetary
policy transmission would therefore be to aﬀect the real interest rate, and
thereby the net present value of ﬁrm proﬁts and in turn ﬁrm entry. Although
plausible, we choose to emphasize the reverse of the coin, namely the eﬀect
of monetary policy on the cost of entry. We do so for four major reasons
which we enumerate below. Nonetheless, we should not loose sight of the
fact that fundamentally, in our model, monetary policy aﬀects Tobin’s Q,
and through that, investment and consumption.
First, we aim to introduce minimal exogenous persistence in order not to
steal the spotlight from the model’s endogenous source of inertia discussed
at length above. The link between monetary policy and real interest rates
typically comes by assuming price rigidity in the goods market. But in our
case, this would introduce an additional source of persistence that would
be hard to untangle in the interpretation of results. Second, assuming that
monetary policy aﬀects the real interest rate could also come from a rigidity in
nominal rates. But this would entail modeling at least a rudimentary credit
market and possibly allowing ﬁrms to ﬁnance entry costs by issuing risky
corporate debt; a very plausible assumption, yet one that detracts from the
model’s simplicity.9 Third, expected proﬁts are generally hard to estimate
and usually expressed with a wide range. Changes in real interest rates do
little to change these vague forecasts. Instead, what is more tangible to ﬁrm






is equivalent to the real interest rate, deﬁned as Rt − (Pt+1 − Pt) in linear
terms.
9The work of Stebunovs (2006), mentioned in the introduction, could be used as a basis
to extend our model in this direction.
27managers and entrepreneurs is the cost of entry. Changes in these are an
important driver of investment decisions.10 Fourth, we like to emphasize the
central role played by entry costs, in order to pick up where the IO literature
leaves oﬀ, namely in linking ﬁrm entry, or concentration, to a market’s sunk
entry costs. Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991), for instance, make
this relationship the center piece of their analysis.
4.2 Introducing nominal rigidities in entry costs
Given the above arguments, we introduce stickiness in entry costs, or lawyer
fees. This allows a monetary surprise to aﬀect the real value of entry costs
and thereby engender similar reactions in the model’s variables as seen in
our earlier exercise under ﬂexible prices and exogenous entry costs. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that lawyers set their fees as in the model of Calvo
(1983). Following the usual modeling route would have led us to working
with imperfectly diﬀerentiated lawyers. Yet, in our case, this would have
complicated the analysis and detracted from the plausibility of the story: why
should lawyers be diﬀerentiated? Where do they derive monopoly power?
Where do proﬁts go to? To circumvent these issues, we instead assume a
representative lawyer (of a pool of perfectly competitive lawyers), who faces
a probability of not being able to reset her price in any period.11 In the end,
results for the optimal setting of fees are equivalent, in linear form, to a more
standard imperfect competition Calvo model.
We thus work with a representative lawyer able to reset her price each
10This resonates with anecdotal evidence related by entrepreneurs and venture capital-
ists that ideas abound, but the main limitation to their development is the availability or
cost of funding.
11Many thanks so Jean Imbs to have suggested this clever simpliﬁcation.
28period with a probability (1 − λ). Recall that total expenditures on entry
fees are given by vn
t NE,t or fn
E,tNE,t, as deﬁned in the budget constraint (8).
Thus, NE,t can be seen as capturing the total number of fees paid to the
representative lawyer (one contract per ﬁrm, say) and fn
E,t the actual entry
fee. Furthermore, we assume that the representative lawyer, on her end, is
concerned with covering her marginal costs deﬁned as:
MC
n
t = fEPt (25)
where the aggregate price of consumption goods is used to transform real
values to nominal ones. This marginal cost does not mean that the lawyer
has to pay a production input. The cost is instead non-tangible, capturing,
for instance, the opportunity cost of time. This assumption simpliﬁes the
analysis without detracting from the model’s core message. Conveniently,
this deﬁnition of marginal costs implies that optimal real fees, when the
setting of fees is ﬂexible, is fE, which is as speciﬁed in the earlier benchmark
analysis without nominal rigidities (except, of course, that the prior analysis
considered time varying fees).
What remains to be found is the optimal fee, or cost of entry, f∗
E,t, charged
by the representative lawyer given the probability of not being able to reset
fees each period. We assume the lawyer maximizes her proﬁt function with
respect to the quantity of contracts, while facing a horizontal demand curve

















Results are standard and discussed in more details in appendix B.1. It can be
shown that the optimal fee is forward looking, taking into account the prob-
29ability of not being able to alter entry fees for several periods. In deviations


















Thus, if λ, the parameter capturing the degree of stickiness, were equal
to zero – consistently with ﬂexible fees – b f∗
E,t would also equal zero, meaning
that lawyers would be able to reset their fees to exactly match any inﬂation,
so that (real) entry fees would not deviate from steady state and the nominal
fee would just cover nominal marginal costs. This is consistent with equation
25. In this case, monetary policy would be ineﬀective. On the contrary, when
0 < λ 6 1, monetary policy regains its channel of transmission because of
the sluggishness in the revision of entry fees.
Finally, since the representative lawyer can only resent her fees with prob-
ability (1−λ), entry fees at any given time are given by the usual aggregate
price condition under Calvo (1983)-type rigidities.12 13
b fE,t = (1 − λ)b f
∗
E,t + λb fE,t−1 − λ(b Pt+1 − b Pt) (28)
4.3 Model dynamics
The model with sticky entry costs introduces two new diﬀerence equations,
capturing the newly introduced rigidities: the equation for optimal lawyer
fees (27) and the resulting equation for entry costs (28), listed above. To
complete the system, we add the equations listed in the ﬂexible fees version
12Usually, this condition represents a snap-shot in time of prices weighed by the ﬁrms
that have reset and those that have not. In the case of a representative ﬁrm – or lawyer,
as in our case – the formula above represents the expected, or average, price in any period.
13This condition is more intuitive when expressed in nominal terms: b fn




30of the model, namely the equation of motion for the number of ﬁrms (6)
along with the solution for new ﬁrm entry (24), and the Euler equation in
shares (15). The additional equations (in linearized form) needed to solve
for all the other variables of interest appear in Appendix B.2.
Imposing nominal rigidities only on the legal sector simpliﬁes the analysis
signiﬁcantly by establishing a clear dichotomy between the real and monetary
parts of the model. The equations capturing price stickiness become mere
add-ons to an already familiar system, so that the eﬀects of monetary policy
feed right into the established dynamics of the ﬂexible fees model reviewed
earlier. Thus, we can expect to ﬁnd very similar results to the simulations
in section 3.
We consider the driving force behind the system’s dynamics to be a shock
to the growth of the money supply, as is standard in many New Keynesian
monetary models.14 We deﬁne a monetary shock as an unexpected change in
the growth rate of money, given an autoregressive process for money growth
known by all agents:
∆Mt = ρM∆Mt−1 + t (29)
where the shock t takes a value of zero except in period t, thereby giving a
one time impulse to the system.
5 Simulation results with sticky entry costs
5.1 Calibrations
We retain the principal parameter values chosen for the simulations under
ﬂexible fees. In addition to these, we set ρM to 0.9, to mirror the autoregres-
14See Gali (2002), for instance.
31sive coeﬃcient on sunk costs used earlier. We set λ to 0.75, as in Gali (2002).
This corresponds, on average, to entry costs sticking for four quarters. Also,
we work with several diﬀerent wage elasticities of labor supply: 0.25, 1, and
4. As King and Rebelo (2000) remind us, the assumption of log-utility in
consumption and a low steady state fraction of time spent working imply
a wage elasticity of labor supply of four. Microeconomic evidence, though,
suggest that these are typically much lower than unity (see Pencavel, 1986,
for instance).
5.2 Results and comments
Impulse response functions are presented in ﬁgure 3. Here, as opposed to
the results for ﬂexible (and exogenous) fees, we list a much wider range of
variables. The results we discuss below follow a one standard deviation shock
(based on an assumed variance of 10) to the growth rate of money. This
induces money growth to jump, then gradually come back to steady state.
The money stock thus increases gradually (at a decreasing rate) to its new
steady state. Prices, as expected, jump then follow an upward path to settle
at a higher equilibrium. The representative lawyer is caught oﬀ guard due to
the unexpected nature of the shock. But immediately thereafter will attempt
to reset her price with probability (1 − λ) as a function of her expectations
of future prices. Thus, real aggregate entry costs decrease initially, then
increase slowly to return to their original steady state. As can be seen in
ﬁgure 3.
One particularity, of relatively minor interest, is worth noting ﬁrst. Real
entry costs do not immediately drop to their lowest levels, but take three to
four periods to do so. This is simply due to the interplay in the dynamics of
32entry costs (28) between b f∗
E,t+1 and (b Pt+1 − b Pt) in equation (28); since after
the original jump in prices the latter is much larger than the former, b fE,t+1 is
pulled down with respect to b fE,t. As the change in prices quickly diminishes,
the change in entry costs becomes positive, as would be expected of the lawyer
trying to cover her higher marginal costs. This mechanism lies at the heart
of the sluggishness (slow to move away from steady state) in investment.
Secondarily, this also explains why, when labor supply is particularly high,
consumption, investment and output exhibit a somewhat surprising jolt in
the ﬁrst period: ﬁrms postpone entry while waiting for lawyer fees to come
down further, a reaction similar in nature to the inter-temporal tradeoﬀ in
investment which we recognized in the model under ﬂexible fees.
Otherwise, ﬁgure 3 generally exhibits impulse response functions simi-
lar to those of the model under ﬂexible fees with a tradeoﬀ. As discussed
already, this is expected. In particular, the sluggishness and persistence of
the impulse response functions is inherited from the consumption-investment
tradeoﬀ already present in the simpler ﬂexible fees set-up. This similarity is
most noticeable in the path of Nt.
One notable diﬀerence with earlier results is that the size of the impulse
responses diminishes with the wage elasticity of labor supply. As the latter
becomes more inelastic, fewer ﬁrms are created since labor income is not
suﬃcient to cover as high investment levels without giving up excessive con-
sumption. This stands out when comparing two extreme cases (ϕ = 0.25
vs. 4): although investment is more subdued in the ﬁrst case, consump-
tion still dips further than in the second case, in the face of a tighter labor
income constraint. As labor supply becomes more elastic, not only can con-
33sumers aﬀord to engage in more investment (higher peak in NE,t), but this
investment is concentrated in a shorter time frame (faster return of NE,t to
steady state) to take advantage of the most favorable entry conditions pos-
sible. But in all three cases of labor elasticity, investment comes back to its
initial steady state before entry costs, due to the inter-temporal shift in ﬁrm
creation. Thus, the low contemporaneous correlation between entry costs
and ﬁrm entry, as remarked earlier, continues to hold.
Of paramount importance, output (Yt), consumption and investment are
positively correlated to monetary surprises and display hump shaped patterns
similar to those observed empirically and emphasized in Christiano et al.
(2005), or Romer and Romer (2004), or even Bergin and Corsetti (2005) and
Lewis (2006) concerning investment – or ﬁrm creation – in particular. The
hump in output is most clear, reaching its apex seven to sixteen quarters
(depending on labor elasticity) after the initial shock. Investment peaks
faster, as a result of entry costs reaching their trough almost immediately.
Consumption also exhibits a smooth, hump shape, but only after an initial
downward and smaller hump. This is due to the decrease in consumption
following the monetary shock, as needed to free up funds for investment
purposes. Romer and Romer (2004) point out a similar “double hump”
pattern, but in the implied response function of output to a monetary shock.15
Of potential importance to central banks, the model results emphasize the
long lasting eﬀects that a temporary shock can have. Although the money
stock reaches its new steady state after 50 periods, real variables such as
consumption, wages, production and GDP come back to steady state after
about 100 periods. The actual number of periods is misleading as it is an
15Corresponding to ﬁgure 2 in their paper.
34artifact of the somewhat debatable choice of parameters; but it remains that
the eﬀect of monetary policy is felt for about two times longer than the policy
impetus.
Otherwise, the real interest rate, RRt, plays its expected role to clear the
inter-temporal consumption market, as warranted by the Euler equation in
bonds. Indeed, the real interest rate is positive when consumption swells
and negative when it wanes. Christiano et al. (2005) note that real rates fall
after a monetary shock. Our ability to reproduce this result is mixed: real
rates do remain in negative territory for most of their time away from steady
state, but they surge to positive levels for a short period early on. This is due
to the initial negative hump in consumption, and interest rates needing to
remain positive for a while in order to pull consumption comfortably above
steady state, a result not discussed in Christiano et al. (2005).
One apparent drawback of our model’s simulations is the lack of liquidity
eﬀect. This was already a puzzle in traditional New Keynesian models, as
pointed out in Gali (2002), which is only able to give rise to a liquidity eﬀect
with particular values of risk aversion and money growth autocorrelation.
We do not ﬁnd a liquidity eﬀect probably because inﬂation jumps too much
and too quickly (thus pushing up the nominal interest rate). In and of itself,
the lack of sluggishness in inﬂation is also a relative weakness of our model,
yet it follows from assuming ﬂexible prices in the goods market, a direction
we took explicitly in order not to cloud our results with excessive exogenous
persistence. We thus made the choice of emphasizing the model’s impact on
real variables, at the expense of realistic patterns in nominal variables. A
possible extension of our model with sticky goods prices would have a better
35chance of generating a liquidity eﬀect as well as persistent inﬂation.
The labor market is in line with empirical ﬁndings. The increase in real
wages following the monetary shock conforms with one the main stylized facts
raised in Christiano et al. (2005). Labor supply (ll on the graphs) increases
as expected with the real wage, ωt, as needed to attract labor to satisfy the
greater number of ﬁrms and higher aggregate output. Almost by deﬁnition,
the eﬀect diminishes with the wage elasticity of labor supply. Interestingly,
though, labor supply comes back to steady state relatively quickly (by even
overshooting it). This is due to the decreasing marginal utility of a rising level
of consumption, which peaks only after real wages do (recall the opposing
eﬀect of consumption and real wages on labor supply). In passing, note that
the continued positive level of output even while labor supply is back at its
steady state comes from a higher degree of available varieties; once again,
this feature underlines the fact that our variables are given in welfare-relevant
terms. We revisit this result in our robustness checks.
Lastly, we note that the extent and duration of all the above-mentioned
impulse response functions diminish with the degree of price stickiness, λ.
At the extreme, when λ = 0, we are back in the ﬂexible fee world in which
real entry costs are unaﬀected by monetary policy. As a result, none of the
real variables budge and monetary shocks only aﬀect prices.16
5.3 Robustness checks: changing the love of variety
We focus here on the role of consumers’ love of variety. In the results dis-
cussed above, all simulations were run using ξ = 1/(θ − 1), as in the classic
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) case. Thus, the impulse response functions represent
16These results are available upon request.
36welfare-relevant variables. But not all statistical agencies account for variety
in their published indices. And those that do, like in the U.S., do not do so
at the frequency inherent in our simulations (1 period = 1 quarter). Thus,
on the one hand, it may be more realistic to work with smaller ξ parameters.
On the other hand, for the purposes of welfare analysis, it may be warranted
to consider a strong preference for variety, as seems to be the case in indus-
trial economies. To illustrate the eﬀect of changes in ξ, we present results for
three iterations of ξ: 0, 1/(θ − 1) and 0.6 (about twice 1/(θ − 1)). Results
appear in ﬁgure 4.
Generally, a small value of ξ shaves oﬀ a signiﬁcant part of the rise in con-
sumption, investment, and output. This is as expected. The large upswings
in these variables were in part driven by the diversity of product oﬀerings. As
variety is valued less (a lower ξ), a unit of expenditure on a good provides less
consumption-based utility. Thus, consumption and investment peak lower,
contributing to a ﬂatter output curve. On the contrary, as ξ increases, the
eﬀects of a monetary shock are magniﬁed considerably.
One particular feature is worth mentioning: the correlation between out-
put and labor supply grows as ξ decreases. When love of variety is null,
output is only a function of labor employed, and no longer responds to the
number of ﬁrms (as can be seen in equation 19). In addition, as ξ decreases,
labor supply is increasingly dependent on consumption at the expense of
real wages, since the latter no longer responds to the number of ﬁrms (as can
be seen in equation 17). Thus, ξ = 0 represents the case when labor sup-
ply most overshoots its return to steady state, thereby also pushing output
brieﬂy below steady state after an initial and much larger expansion.
37Lastly, we note that changes in ξ aﬀect only real variables, leaving nom-
inal variables nearly unchanged. Again, this is due to our assumption of
adjustable goods prices, whereby variations in nominal variables are domi-
nated by the monetary shock, as in a ﬂexible price setting.
We generally remain agnostic as to the correct choice of ξ, but until
statistical agencies pay closer attention to variety, we note that the crux of
our results, namely the hump shaped patterns in real variables following a
monetary shock, remain true despite changes to the love of variety.
6 Conclusion
We found motivation for this paper among the quickly growing empirical lit-
erature pointing to the central role of ﬁrm entry and exit as an endogenous
propagation mechanism for macro-economic shocks. More speciﬁcally, we
were encouraged by recent empirical and anecdotal ﬁndings emphasizing the
positive correlation between ﬁrm entry and monetary expansions. We were
also motivated by the challenge of oﬀering an alternative modeling response
– less dependent on exogenous rigidities – to the New Keynesian models’ dif-
ﬁculty of generating persistent and sluggish responses to monetary surprises.
In response to these stimulations, we developed a monetary model where
ﬁrm entry is endogenous. To enter, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms must
pay a sunk fee, then wait one period before being able to produce. The
payment of this fee is intended to be synonymous with costs such as the
setting-up of operations, hiring, R&D, marketing or other activities. Entry
is regulated by consumers who optimize spending between consumption and
investment in new ﬁrms. This introduces an endogenous source of inertia
38in the model, as consumers aim to smooth consumption and therefore do
not immediately succumb to the requests for funding when entry conditions
suddenly turn favorable.
In our model, monetary policy shocks directly aﬀect the cost-beneﬁt anal-
ysis preceding entry, by inﬂuencing Tobin’s Q, or the ratio of expected future
proﬁts to the cost of entry. We do so by assuming that entry costs are set a
la Calvo (1983), while goods prices remain ﬂexible throughout the analysis.
In doing so, we were inspired by a wide body of research in the IO literature
pointing to the relevance of sunk costs for ﬁrm entry.
As a result of this apparatus, monetary policy has signiﬁcant real eﬀects,
as shocks generate persistent, as well as hump shaped responses of consump-
tion, investment, output and the number of ﬁrms. This is as observed in
the data (see, for instance, Christiano et al., 2005, or Romer and Romer,
2004), but as generated only with signiﬁcant diﬃculty, or with a series of
assumed exogenous rigidities, in traditional New Keynesian models. Our
model therefore stands apart as presenting minimal nominal rigidities and
simple microfounded dynamics underlying a new channel for the transmission
of monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Benchmark model in ﬂexible prices, variant I: Temporary shock
to fE,t with autoregressive coeﬃcient 0.9. The responses exhibit endogenous






























Figure 2: Benchmark model in ﬂexible prices, variant II: Temporary shock
to fE,t with autoregressive coeﬃcient 0.9. The impulse responses exhibit no






































































Figure 3: Temporary shock to money growth, with autoregressive coeﬃcient
0.9 in a model with Calvo pricing in entry costs and diﬀerent wage elasticities
of labor supply. Solid line: ϕ = 0.25, hyphenated line: ϕ = 1, dotted line:



































































Figure 4: Temporary shock to money growth, in a model with Calvo pricing
in entry costs, ϕ = 1 and diﬀerent degrees of love of variety. Hyphenated
line: ξ = 0 (no love of variety), solid line: ξ = 1/(θ − 1) (the Dixit-Stiglitz
case), dotted line: ξ = 0.6 (high love of variety).SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
– APPENDIX –
A The benchmark model with ﬂexible prices
For clarity, it is convenient to refer to the model with a tradeoﬀ between
consumption and investment as “variant I”, and to that without a tradeoﬀ
as “variant II”.
A.1 Variant I: general equilibrium and aggregate ac-
counting
A slight complication of our model is dealing with investment in a real setup
based on monopolistic competition. But a series of straightforward assump-
tions make its solution nearly standard. As explained in the text, variant
I assumes that consumers allocate their revenues between consumption and
investment, and that the amount going to investment eventually ﬁnds its way
in the hands of lawyers who spend their earnings on consumption goods. We
justify this formally by assuming that lawyers have the same utility function
as consumers, except that they have an inﬁnite time discount factor, so they
undertake no investment. Thus, total consumption, CT
t , equals consumers’
consumption, Ct, plus lawyers’ consumption, CL
t . The CES consumption












where ct and cL
t represent consumers’ and lawyers’ respective consumption of
an individual ﬁrm’s output. To ﬁnd optimal demand for a ﬁrm’s variety, it is
useful to think of a social planner, choosing cT
t = ct+cL
t in order to maximize
total consumption, CT
t as deﬁned above, subject to
R
Nt ptcT
t di = Zt, where








which is equation (16) in the text.
In turn, this equation can be used as the demand function facing a mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrm choosing its optimal price, pt, to maximize
proﬁts. In the usual way, we ﬁnd that pt = [θ/(θ − 1)] · MCt, where MCt
stands for marginal costs, as in equation (3) in the text.From these pricing and demand equations, as well as the real wage equa-
tion (17) in the text, it is simple to ﬁnd the equation for ﬁrm proﬁts, central






















where the last line makes use of the optimal demand equation (31) above.
Finally, we check that general equilibrium holds by focussing on the ag-
gregate accounting condition (21) in the text, repeated here in real terms for
simplicity:
Ct + vtNE,t = ωtLt + dtNt
Focussing on the right hand side, we write:



























where the the second line makes use of the ﬁrm production function, (1) in
the text, the third and fourth lines are algebra, the ﬁfth line makes use of the
deﬁnition of ρt, (11) in the text, the ﬁrm production function and the labor
accounting constraint, and ﬁnally, the sixth line interprets the equation in
line ﬁve as a production function, as would have resulted from simply taking
ﬁrm speciﬁc production yt and multiplying by the number of ﬁrms Nt and ρt
to get an aggregate real value.
Thus, consumption plus investment in new ﬁrms, the left hand side of the
aggregate accounting equation, does equal aggregate output, as necessary
for general equilibrium to hold. Note that this allows us to write dt =
(Yt − ωtLt)/Nt, a condition that is useful to double check certain results
in the text, such as the equation for real wages.A.2 Variant I: steady state analysis
The following equations in steady state provide useful results and strengthen
our intuitive understanding of the model. We deﬁne the steady state as the
period when all variables are stationary; in particular, inﬂation is zero and
there is no consumption growth.






Second, the Euler equation in shares can be simpliﬁed to a useful form:




Importantly, the free entry condition will serve to determine the number
of ﬁrms in the economy. The complicated expression for ﬁrm value formerly















For convenience, we call the term in parentheses the long term discount
factor and label it D. We can also check that solving the Euler equation in
shares (35) for v also yields expression (36) above. The system’s equations
are therefore in agreement.
The free entry condition gives us:
v = fE (37)












(39)Also, from (37) and (36), we deduce that:
d = fE/D (40)
Thus, as entry costs increase, proﬁts also increase. This relationship can
be explained with arguments similar to those underlying the variety eﬀect
on aggregate prices. Indeed, as entry costs increase, there are fewer ﬁrms
surviving at steady state, but each ﬁrm will produce more thus increasing
proﬁts which are entirely dependent on the volume of sales since margins are
ﬁxed.
From these ﬂow the two main steady state equations which we repeat and

















And the Euler equation in shares:
C = fENθ








Finally, the steady state equation for the number of new ﬁrms can be














Going one step further, we ﬁnd that as expected, the number of ﬁrms


























































From inspection of equation (44), we note that all terms are positive,
except for the ﬁrst.17 Indeed, the condition supporting our intuition that the
number of ﬁrms decreases with a rise in sunk entry costs summarizes to:
∂N
∂fE
< 0, if ξ < 1, for γ = 1
which, in fact, imposes a natural constraint on ξ.
It is also possible to to show that sign of ∂C







which is always true since all terms are positive and ∂N
∂fE < 0 as shown above.
This supports our intuition mentioned in the text that when fewer ﬁrms
exist in equilibrium, a lower level of investment (thus higher consumption)
is necessary to replace exiting ﬁrms.
A.3 Variant I: main linearized equations
The central system of diﬀerence equations in Ct and Nt is constituted by the
Euler equation in shares and the equation of motion of ﬁrms, after solving
for NE,t. This yields (were variables without time subscripts refer to steady
state values and “hats” indicate percent deviations from steady state):








where N and NE are speciﬁed in equations (41) and (43) above.
And the second equation is:
−γ b Ct =
















+ β(1 − δ)

Et[b fE,t+1] − b fE,t (46)
17This is also true for Φ which is positive if θ > [βδ/(1 − β(1 − δ))], a condition that is
easily satisﬁed given the plausible range of our parameter values.The remaining equation specifying the number of entering ﬁrms (also





















and where C is determined in equation (42) above.
A.4 Variant II: the modiﬁed equations
In contrast to variant I in which entry costs are ﬁnanced by consumers,
paid by ﬁrms to lawyers, then used for lawyers’ consumption, we assume in
this variant that lawyers rebate their revenues to consumers in the form of
transfer payments. This makes the consumption decision independent of the
investment decision, as discussed below. This variant is important to consider
mainly in order to contrast results with variant I, and thereby emphasize the
importance of the consumption-investment decision as the main source of
inertia in our model.
In variant II, we write the budget constraint as:
PtCt + Mt + R
−1
t Bt + v
n
t (Nt + NE,t)xt =




t )Ntxt−1 + f
n
E,tNE,txt + Tt (48)
where fn
E,tNE,txt are total entry fees received by lawyers. This term is central
to this second variant of the benchmark model. By making use of the free
entry condition (5), note that the amount consumers allocate to ﬁnancing
new ﬁrm entry, vn
t NE,txt, exactly equals the sum rebated to them by lawyers,
fn
E,tNE,txt. Thus, there is no tradeoﬀ between consuming and ﬁnancing ﬁrm
entry. In other words, the consumption smoothing objective does not con-
strain investment or ﬁrm entry from being particularly jagged.















And the equation for ﬁrm value naturally emanates as a forward solution
















(50)where we use the ratio of future ﬁrms to today’s to capture the proportion
of ﬁrms surviving the death shock, and no longer (1 − δ), as in variant I.
Importantly, the equation for proﬁts, (20) in the text, also changes, but we
introduce it below in the discussion on the goods market clearing condition.
A.5 Variant II: equilibrium conditions
A.5.1 Aggregate accounting
When imposing the equilibrium conditions as in the text, we can simplify
the budget constraint to:
PtCt = WtLt + d
n
t Nt (51)
which we call the aggregate accounting equation.
Note that the right hand side is the economy’s GDP, comprised of labor
and proﬁt revenue as in variant I, but the left hand side represents consump-
tion only. Investment in new ﬁrms, as mentioned before, cancels out with
the kickback received from lawyers.
A.5.2 The goods market
We know that at the ﬁrm level, yt = ct, or equivalently, using (16), yt =
ρ
−θ
t Aθ−1Ct = N
−ξ−1
t Ct; we call this the ﬁrm level equilibrium condition which
does not hold in variant I as discussed earlier. We then make use of the
aggregate production function speciﬁed in the text, Yt = Ntρtyt. Taken
together, these two equations yield:
Yt = Ct (52)
which represents aggregate equilibrium in the goods market. Note that the
equivalent condition in variant I equated output to consumption plus net
investment.
Alternatively, we could have started by the equilibrium condition at the
ﬁrm level, yt = ct, and integrated both sides using the same power mean















Then, we notice that the right hand side is equivalent to aggregate con-
sumption Ct and the left to Yt. The former is evident from the CES indexgiven in (9). The later comes from simplifying the integral under the as-
sumption that yt is equal for all ﬁrms, yielding N
ξ+1
t yt which is equivalent to
Yt as per the aggregate production function Yt = Ntρtyt.





thus changing the Euler equation in shares.
A.5.3 The labor market
The equation for real wages (17), as well as the labor supply function (13),
yield a ﬁrst relationship between the number of ﬁrms and consumption, given
total labor employed (see equation 18 in the text).
Alternatively, the labor market accounting condition, Lt = Ntlt, coupled
with the ﬁrm level production function (1) as well as the aggregate production
function in the form Yt = N
ξ+1
t yt, yield a second expression for total labor







Note that this equation is only true given the simple goods market equi-
librium condition (52) above, which is not satisﬁed in variant I, since total
output in the economy is given by consumption plus investment output.
Together, equations (18) and (54) yield an expression for the number of














At this point, two important comments are called for. First, contrarily
to variant I, we lack an additional constraint limiting entry and allowing us
to ﬁnd NE,t as a by-product of the aggregate accounting condition, or the
labor market equilibrium.18 At a deeper level, since entry fees are a transfer
and thus consumption and investment are orthogonal, there is no constraint
on the ﬁnancing of new ﬁrms. Thus, in this variant, we backtrack NE,t from
the equation of motion of ﬁrms (6), after solving for the dynamic path of Nt.
We discuss model dynamics in more details in section A.7 below.
18The latter is as in Bilbiie et al. (2005), since they assume entry absorbs labor, thus
imposing an additional constraint on labor market accounting.Second, it may be surprising to notice that Nt does not depend on fE,t,
the cost of entry. Intuitively, if this cost were to increases, fewer ﬁrms would
enter and vice a versa; we would thus expect to ﬁnd a negative relationship
between Nt and fE,t. The reason we do not is that both Nt and Ct depend on
fE,t; the latter thus cancels from expression (55). The ensuing steady state
analysis conﬁrms this relationship, and thus our intuition outlined above.
A.6 Variant II: steady state
The steady state results are very similar to those of variant I, presented in
(A.2) above. The equations that change are the following.














For convenience, we again call the term in parentheses the long term discount
factor and label it D.





and equation (40) still holds.
Fourth, considerations of labor market equilibrium, as shown in the text,
yield a new and central equation to variant II linking the number of ﬁrms












This equation, along with the proﬁt equation (40) and the alternate ex-
pression above for proﬁts (58) suggest an expression for N in terms of fE













(60)Plugging this particular result back into the proﬁt equation yields a com-
















To develop intuition for these complicated, yet central, expressions, it is
useful to ﬁrst analyze how both the number of ﬁrms and consumption or











Since we know that N
fE is positive, we concentrate instead on ﬁnding the
sign on the term in parentheses. Inspection tells us that the numerator is




< 0 iﬀ 0 ≤ ξ < 1
which is the same as that found for variant I.
A.7 Variant II: main linearized equations
Given the above derivations, simpliﬁcations and discussions, we retain two
principle equations as suﬃcient to describe the system’s dynamics: the labor
market condition (55) linking today’s number of ﬁrms with today’s consump-
tion, as well as the Euler equation in shares (49), capturing the intertemporal





b Ct + (1 − θ)b Zt (63)
and
−γ b Ct = (1 − β − γ)Et[b Ct+1] + βEt[ b Nt+1] − b Nt
+β b fE,t+1 − b fE,t (64)
where we made use of the free entry condition (5) and the steady state results
that C
fEθN + 1 = 1
β to simplify the above. Note that by plugging (63) into
(64), we remain with just one diﬀerence equation in consumption, which issuﬃcient to ﬁnd the dynamic paths of all variables. This is a particularity
of variant II.
Finally, to ﬁnd the path of NE,t, also shown in ﬁgure 2, we linearize the
equation of motion of ﬁrms (6):
b Nt = (1 − δ) b Nt−1 + δ b NE,t−1 (65)
B Model with sticky entry costs
B.1 Deriving lawyers’ optimal fees

















as in the text, facing a horizontal demand curve, since lawyers are non-
diﬀerentiated.















Note, of course, that if this were a one period problem (i.e. the lawyer
was able to reset her fees freely), then the optimal fee, fn∗
E,t, would equal
MCn
t+k, as prescribed by the theory of perfect competition.
We then recall from the text the deﬁnition of marginal costs, MCn
t =
fEPt, so that in steady state, fn
E = MCn = fn∗
E . With this useful result, we













which can be solved for the lawyer’s optimal price:
b f
n∗







To simplify, we note ﬁrst that d MC
n
t+k = b Pt+k given the above deﬁnition
of marginal costs. We then take the ﬁrst term of the above equation, i.e.when k = 0, and write all remaining terms as b fn∗











or, in real terms, by noting that b fn∗
E,t = b f∗














which is the same as in the text and in the same form as the usual optimal
price derived with Calvo (1983)-type rigidities. The same result could have
been obtained by supposing that lawyers were imperfectly diﬀerentiated, as
is more traditional in Calvo-type setups, yet as would have been diﬃcult
to conceptualize given our model and story. Dealing with a representative
lawyer faced with a probability of not being able to reset her price contributes
to the simplicity of our model.
B.2 Additional linearized equations
The equation for money demand, from (12):




where we made use of the fact that R = 1/β in steady state as in (34) and we
deﬁne β ≡ 1/(1+σ) as in Gali and Gertler (1999), where σ is the subjective
discount parameter.
The Euler equation in bonds, from (14):
−γ b Ct = b Rt − γEt[b Ct+1] − Et[b Pt+1 − b Pt] (71)
The equation for production output, or real GDP, from (19):
b Yt = ξ b Nt + b Lt + b Zt (72)
The equation for real wages, from (17):
b ωt = ξ b Nt + b Zt (73)
The equation for labor supply, from (18):
b Lt = ϕξ b Nt − ϕγ b Ct + ϕb Zt (74)The equation for the real interest rate:
d RRt ≡ b Rt − Et(b Pt+1 − b Pt) (75)
The equation for inﬂation:
Πt ≡ b Pt − b Pt−1 (76)
And the equation for money growth:
c Mt = (1 + ρM)c Mt−1 − ρM c Mt−2 + ut (77)
where ut = t/M.